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ABSTRACT
Introduction In response to detonation of an 
improvised explosive device at the Manchester Arena 
on 22 May 2017, we aimed to use detailed information 
about injured patients flowing through hospital 
healthcare to objectively evaluate the preplanned 
responses of a regional trauma care system and to 
show how routinely collected hospital performance 
data can be used to assess impact on regional 
healthcare.
Methods Data about injury severity, management 
and outcome for patients presenting to hospitals were 
collated using England’s major trauma registry for 
30 days following hospital attendance. System- wide 
data about hospital performance were collated by 
National Health Service England’s North West Utilisation 
Management Unit and presented as Shewhart charts 
from 15 April 2017 to 25 June 2017.
Results Detailed information was obtained on 153 
patients (109 adults and 44 children) who attended 
hospital emergency departments after the incident. 
Within 6 hours, a network of 11 regional trauma care 
hospitals received a total of 138 patients (90%). For 
the whole patient cohort, median Injury Severity Score 
(ISS) was 1 (IQR 1–10) and median New ISS (NISS) was 
2 (IQR 1–14). For the 75 patients (49%) attending a 
major trauma centre, median ISS was 7.5 (IQR 1–14) and 
NISS was 10 (IQR 3–22). Limb and torso body regions 
predominated when injuries were classified as major life 
threatening (Abbreviated Injury Scale>3). Ninety- three 
patients (61%) required hospital admission following 
emergency department management, with 21 (14%) 
requiring emergency damage control surgery and 24 
(16%) requiring critical care. Three fatalities occurred 
during early resuscitative treatment and 150 (98%) 
survived to day 30. The increased system- wide hospital 
admissions and care activity was linked to increases in 
regional hospital care capacity through cancellations 
of elective surgery and increased community care. 
Consequently, there were sustained system- wide hospital 
service improvements over the following weeks.
Conclusions The systematic collation of injured 
patient and healthcare system data has provided an 
objective evaluation of a regional major incident plan 
and provided insight into healthcare system resilience. 
Hospital patient care data indicated that a prerehearsed 
patient dispersal plan at incident scene was implemented 
effectively.
INTRODUCTION
Major public health concerns regarding healthcare 
system preparedness for civilian terrorist attacks 
have been raised regularly despite well publicised 
guidance on the preparation and response to major 
incidents.1 2 Systematic reviews of data reported 
from patient case series3 or reviews of mass casualty 
management strategies4 all help inform on learning 
and health systems planning for terrorist attack 
in civilian settings.5 However, low- quality case 
reporting and anecdotal expert opinion contribute 
to an acknowledged limited evidence base of rele-
vant patient and health services data from real 
major incidents.3–6
The preparation of emergency response plans for 
major trauma incidents requires systems level infor-
mation that can be used to anticipate the demands 
placed on a healthcare system.6 Such data can be 
obtained as part of simulated exercises7 8 but are 
ideally obtained from healthcare system responses 
to major incidents. The systematic collection, 
archiving and publication of data of an internation-
ally agreed nature would provide a body of infor-
mation to planning processes and support capacity 
assessment, but this is not routinely done.
Key messages
What is already known on this subject
 ► There is an acknowledged inadequate evidence 
base to assess healthcare responses to civilian 
terrorist attacks and to inform health systems 
planning.
What this study adds
 ► Systematic collation of both individual 
patient hospital data (through deployment 
of a national trauma register) and hospital 
performance data has allowed evaluation of a 
civilian trauma care system’s planned responses 
to a major terrorist incident and healthcare 
system resilience.
 ► Collection, archiving and use of patient and 
healthcare data in an agreed, standardised way 
can facilitate improvements in the evidence 
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This paper reports detailed injury and care data systematically 
by utilising an established national trauma registry and delin-
eates patient flow through a civilian healthcare system following 
a major terrorism incident. These patient- level data provide 
an opportunity to objectively evaluate a trauma care system’s 
planned healthcare responses. We also show how routinely 
collected system- wide healthcare performance data can be used 
to assess the consequent impact on regional healthcare provision.
METHODS
Incident description
Data presented in this paper arise from the responses of an 
integrated acute healthcare system to events at the Manchester 
Arena, UK, on 22 May 2017. A shrapnel- laden improvised explo-
sive device (IED) was detonated at 22:31 in one of the Arena’s 
foyers. Attendees were streaming out of the 21 000- capacity 
auditorium, the largest indoor arena in the UK, following a 
concert by the American singer Ariana Grande.
Healthcare system setting
The National Health Service (NHS) is the publicly funded 
national healthcare system in the UK. It provides healthcare to 
every resident, with most services—including community and 
hospital emergency care—free at the point of delivery. NHS 
England operates the major trauma service in Manchester as a 
single service system, the Greater Manchester Major Trauma 
Services Network (GMMTSN), which serves a city of circa 3 
million people 180 miles north- west of London.
The GMMTSN was launched in 2012 based on a realisation 
that no single hospital in Greater Manchester had the full spec-
trum of clinical services to act as a single major trauma centre 
(MTC). The GMMTSN engage healthcare providers throughout 
the city to provide a planned response to trauma with defined 
patient and staff pathways. It includes a single, integrated 
prehospital emergency medical service (EMS)—the North West 
Ambulance Service (NWAS). The structure of the GMMTSN is 
unusual in the UK (online supplemental figure S1) where it is 
more common for a single NHS organisation to provide a MTC 
service to a regional network of trauma units and local emer-
gency hospitals, although paediatric major trauma services are 
often provided separately from adult services.
Major incident plans
GMMTSN’s plans for major trauma events were revised 
following the 2015 multisite terrorist attacks in Paris and other 
incidents that year.9–14 The planned and rehearsed scheme for 
system- wide patient dispersal (the Patient Dispersal Framework) 
in the event of a major incident is detailed in online supplemental 
figure S2. The plan did not include provision for collation of 
patient or healthcare system data.
Data collection and sources
Prehospital
Information about incident timelines, prehospital responses, 
patient triage priority categories at scene and ambulance 
transport from incident scene was collated by the NWAS and 
formed part of a report to the Kerslake public review into the 
preparedness and emergency responses to the Manchester Arena 
bombing.15
Emergency department and acute hospital
The Trauma Audit and Research Network (TARN) registry, 
established over 25 years ago, collects prospective, 
observational data from hospitalised major trauma patients in 
all trauma care networks across England.16 TARN provides 
NHS England with confidential information about trauma 
systems performance. When data are available to emergency 
departments, the TARN registry also includes patient level 
prehospital data for those subsequently receiving hospital care 
but does not include patients confirmed dead at the injury 
scene.
As part of GMMTSN’s emergency responses to the inci-
dent, and in response to NHS England’s requests for regular 
incident updates, the TARN registry was deployed to collate 
and archive anonymised healthcare data for all incident 
patients attending emergency departments (including any 
outside of Greater Manchester) and subsequent hospital care 
to 30 days irrespective of injury severity or hospital admission 
status. Data included physiological status at hospital arrival 
and anatomical injuries to derive Injury Severity Scores (ISS) 
(online supplemental material methods S1). In addition, data 
were captured on management, hospital healthcare utilisa-
tion, patient disposition and all- cause mortality to 30 days. 
All research for publication from the TARN database is over-
seen by the TARN Board which is a multidisciplinary group 
including patient and public representatives.
Greater Manchester acute healthcare system
Routinely collected system- wide time series data about the 
provision of acute hospital healthcare were obtained from the 
North West Utilisation Management Unit (https:// heal thin nova 
tion manc hester. com/ our- work/ utilisation- management/). Data 
were collated about hospital emergency attendances, emergency 
Figure 1 Flow diagram for TARN registered patient data. ED, 
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Box 1 Letter to survivors, hospital patients, relatives of hospital patients and members of bereaved families following the 
Manchester Arena bombing
We are contacting you because you were a survivor, hospital patient, or a relative of a hospital patient, or a member of the bereaved 
families following the Manchester Arena bombing in May 2017.
We would like to let you know about a medical research report that we have written about the hospital responses to the Manchester 
Arena bombing incident. Our report is based on anonymised information (ie, patients cannot be identified) that is routinely collected for 
the National Health Service (NHS) by the Trauma Audit and Research Network (TARN). Working with TARN and the NHS, we have been 
able to evaluate Manchester hospitals planned emergency responses to the incident, identifying good practice and improvements for the 
future.
Major incidents continue to occur around the world. In the past, we have learnt valuable lessons from colleagues in the UK and 
abroad. It is, therefore, very important for us to share our learning from Manchester with the wider international healthcare communities. 
Publishing a scientific article, in a peer- reviewed international medical journal, is the established format for achieving this effectively.
Our completed report has now been reviewed confidentially by the British Medical Journal Publishing Group’s Emergency Medicine 
Journal, including input from independent international experts in the field, and a final version has been accepted for publication later in 
2020.
There was an agreement that before this article was published, we would inform you of its content and, more importantly, its significant 
value in assessing and improving major incident plans for the future. Therefore, we are contacting you—following help from Manchester 
City Council and Greater Manchester Police (GMP)—to seek your support if you were hospitalised to proceed with publication.
Our report publication will be read by doctors and other healthcare professionals but will also be seen by many others including journalists and 
the public. Therefore, our report may be the subject of press coverage. You have our commitment that we will work with Manchester City Council 
and GMP to ensure that you are fully informed about any planned press releases in advance.
We thank you for your time considering our request for support to publish our report. A copy of our scientific report can be provided to 
you if you would like to read it. We have decided not to send this directly to you as already mentioned it is very technical with a specific 
audience in mind. We are concerned that any report about the Arena bombing may cause some distress and upset.
We ask that you reply to us by email before 15 August 2020 so that the report authors and the Emergency Medicine Journal editors can 
review your feedback and gauge the level of support prior to a final decision to publish.
Yours faithfully,
Professor Paul Dark, The University of Manchester
Dr Martin Smith, Lead of Greater Manchester NHS Major Trauma Services
15th July 2020.
Commentary from Respondent 27
I have read the Emergency Medical Journal report and noted things that I am NOT happy to read, as I truly believe that in parts it does 
not accurately reflect what I experienced on that night in the aftermath. I also believe it will mislead anyone reading it, so I do not support 
its release to the public. I have given and written several witness statements for the police investigations and the Kerslake Report, none of 
which represent my experiences.
I accept that investigations and reports will always be very sensitive for those seriously affected by this tragic event and who will live 
with it for the rest of their lives. However, I cannot understand why those involved in finding out the details of what happened that night 
would continually cause me (and no doubt all the others affected) more stress, frustration and indeed psychological pain and suffering 
having to read facts that I do not believe are correct.
I will just highlight some important facts that from my perspective don't match in this Emergency Medicine Journal report and I request 
them to be duly noted:
1. Numbers of casualties, timings for causality evacuation and medical help arriving into the foyer (City room), discrepancies between 
various governing bodies and reports, who is correct?
2. During the aftermath in the foyer (City room, where the bomb was detonated) My sister and I did not receive any ‘top to toe’ 
assessment from anyone and it was quite some time before I saw any ‘official’ medical person enter the foyer (City room). I do not 
agree that all casualties including myself were removed from scene (foyer—City room) within the ‘golden hour’.
3. When I was finally removed from the foyer (City room) and taken to the train station holding area (War Memorial entrance). 
Paramedics made several attempts to assess me but each time they were stopped and taken away to assist with other casualties. From 
my perspective and personal experience assessments were chaotic and not well organised or co- ordinated.
A paramedic finally refused to leave me expressing his findings of my injuries and I was immediately upgraded in priority to go to hospital 
in the next available ambulance to arrive.
4. In the chaos, I witnessed this ambulance crew being pressured to move me and get me to hospital even after they had expressed 
concerns that they didn’t have directions which hospital to go to and someone else was using their vehicle. They were then shouted at 
to use another vehicle and get me gone! This resulted in the crew having no keys to access the lockers that contained invaluable pain 
relief for me. I was moved into the ambulance where there was a further delay waiting for directions where to go. I was driven to a 
hospital some distance away. I did not receive any pain relief at any point that night. (Until I arrived at hospital in the early hours next 
morning).
I also witnessed difficulties the ambulance crew had reaching the hospital due to the sat navigation not working which resulted in them 
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department care completion, hospital admissions, cancelled elec-
tive surgery, hospital bed utilisation, patient discharges to the 
community and their delays.
Data presentation and analyses
TARN patient case series
The patient case series is reported using Strengthening the 
Reporting of Observational Studies in Epidemiology criteria and 
figure 1 shows the study flow chart. No data imputation methods 
were used for missing data. Patient- level data are reported as 
medians and interquartile ranges or counts and percentages 
as appropriate. For these observational data, no formal statis-
tical subgroup analyses were planned in advance. In addition, 
the incident hospital data were not suitable for case mix based 
excess survival analysis due to the small number of deaths after 
reaching hospital alive (n=3).
Routine hospital performance data
Whole system acute hospital performance data for Greater 
Manchester are displayed as Shewhart (process behaviour) 
charts.17 Moving average data were modelled (after Koutras et 
al17) by the NHS North West Utilisation Management Unit for 3 
months around the incident data, with lower confidence limits 
(lcl) and upper cl (ucl) indicating the 99.7% expected data limits. 
Six consecutive weeks of data from 15 April 2017 to 25 June 
2017 were charted, including modelled mean daily values with 
upper and lower 99.7% confidence limits, with recorded daily 
data superimposed. Daily recorded data patterns were identified 
for interpretation using the following rule set17: (1) Any points 
approaching or outside the control limits (ucl or lcls); (2) A run 
of 7 points all above or all below the mean data line and (3) A 
run of 7 points up or down.
Patient and public involvement
Patients and the public are represented on the TARN Oversight 
Board who have reviewed and approved this work as it was 
designed in response to a major incident. Patients and relatives 
were approached for support to produce this manuscript and the 
full reply from a patient is published as part of our manuscript.
Ethical considerations
TARN has NHS Health Research Authority (Confidential Advi-
sory Group Section 251) ethics approval to conduct research on 
anonymised patient data. Given the sensitive nature of the data 
reported in this manuscript, we do not reproduce actual group 
numbers when the count is less than 5 to protect from risk of 
patient identification.
The manuscript was reviewed by the Caldicott Guardian for 
the Greater Manchester Health and Social Care Partnership, 
Health Innovation Manchester (Greater Manchester’s health 
and social care research partnership) and representatives of 
Manchester City Council. Survivors, hospital patients, relatives 
of hospital patients and members of bereaved families were 
approached by Greater Manchester Police (GMP) on behalf of 
authors (PMD and MS) to seek support to publish this manu-
script (box 1). These 1004 individuals receive regular confi-
dential email communications from GMP about, for example, 
relevant legal cases and public inquiries related to the Manchester 
Arena bombing. GMP received 27 email replies, of which 26 
were supportive of manuscript publication and with one respon-
dent not supportive (responder 27). Subsequently, responder 27 
agreed to write a commentary in their own words to accompany 
our manuscript (box 1) and is supportive of our approach to 
publication. On behalf of the authors, GMP distributed a copy 




The IED detonation in the Manchester Arena occurred at 22:31 
hour on 22 May 2017. A major incident was declared at 22:46 
which activated a preplanned, rehearsed systems response, 
including implementation of the Patient Dispersal Framework. 
300 health service personnel contributed to coordinating inci-
dent responses and/or attending the scene including 60 paramedic 
ambulances with crews, 8 paramedic rapid response vehicles, 6 
advanced paramedic practitioners, 6 doctors and 3 teams trained 
to operate in hazardous areas. The scene recorded information 
using a patient- level cruciate card system. 59 patients were 
transported by NWAS to GMMTSN hospitals. NWAS reported 
the distribution of recorded triage priority codes at scene for 
these patients as: P1—requires immediate lifesaving treatment 
(n=21); P2—requires urgent treatment within 6 hours (n=24) 
and P3—can be delayed treatment no time limit (n=14). Twenty 
people died at scene, including the person that detonated the 
IED. By 2:46 hour the following morning, all live patients had 
been conveyed from the scene. An additional P3 patients (n=95) 
made their own way to hospitals, self- presenting at an emergency 
Box 1 Continued
5. On arriving to hospital I saw the time on the wall clock in the emergency department. The same time was logged on my medical 
records by the trauma team, which confirms to me I was correct. This has assisted me to work out the time frame against sequence of 
my movements after the explosion and questions I have raised about timings discrepancies in reports.
6. The patient identification card and wristband issued whilst I was in the foyer (City room) identifying important timing, injuries and 
information about me, was removed by a paramedic while I was in the train station (War Memorial entrance) it was not replaced in 
the chaos so it did not accompany me to the hospital. I was told by the GMP weeks after the event that many cards were retrieved 
that night, however, when I asked could I have mine back I was told they had all been destroyed! Surely this information is crucial to 
understand what happened at the scene, therefore I cannot believe or accept that such important evidence was so quickly disposed off. 
Why?
I sat amongst the dead, dying and those fighting for life, I observed the pain and suffering and endured my own. I need to hear the truth 
to be able to move forward and I have to be there for those who didn't make it, they do not have a say in this, so I must speak up for them 
and for my own mental wellbeing, I cannot rest until the truth is told and evidence is shown to me around what actually happened from 
all departments responsible for finding out the truth!
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Table 1 Major incident patients presenting to emergency departments (ED)
All patients Adults (>16 years) Children (<16 years)
No (%) 153 (100%) 109 (71%) 44 (29%)
Median (IQR) age in years 36 (15–47) 45 (34–50) 13 (12–14)
No (%) of females 107 (70%) 68 (62%) 40 (91%)
No (%) of all ED patient arrivals and no requiring critical care (CC)   ED   CC   ED   CC   ED   CC
GM Major Trauma Care System             
  MTC-1 26 (17%) <5 (<3%) 25 (16%) <5 (<3%) <5 (<3%%) 0 (0%)
  MTC-2 8 (5%) 5 (3%) 8 (5%) 5 (3%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
  MTC-3 8 (5%) 5 (3%) 8 (5%) 5 (3%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
  P- MTC 26 (17%) 5 (3%) <5 (<3%) 0 (0%) 22 (14%) 5 (3%)
  TU-1 14 (9%) 0 (0%) 10 (6%) 0 (0%) <5 (<3%) 0 (0%)
  TU-2 11 (7%) <5 (<3%) 10 (6%) <5 (<3%%) <5 (<3%) 0 (0%)
  TU-3 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
  LEH-1 17 (11%) <5 (<3%) 12 (8%) <5 (<3%) 5 (3%) 0 (0%)
  LEH-2 17 (11%) <5 (<3%) 14 (9%) <5 (<3%) <5 (<3%) 0 (0%)
  LEH-3 8 (5%) 0 (0%) 5 (3%) 0 (0%) <5 (<3%) 0 (0%)
  LEH-4 <5 (<3%) 0 (0%) <5 (<3%) 0 (0%) <5 (<3%) 0 (0%)
Outside GM Major Trauma Care System             
  MTC 6 (4%) 0 (0%) <5 (<3%) 0 (0%) <5 (<3%) 0 (0%)
  Non- MTC 9 (6%) 0 (0%) 7 (5%) 0 (0%) <5 (<3%) 0 (0%)
              
















  No (%) by ambulance service 59 (39%) 43 (39%) 16 (36%)
  No (%) by car 57 (37%) 38 (35%) 19 (43%)
  No (%) walked <5 (<3%) <5 (<4%) 0 (0%)
  No (%) not recorded 33 (22%) 24 (22 %)   9 (20%)












  Median (IQR) ISS 1 (1–10) 7.5 (1–14) 1 (1–10) 6 (2–14) 2 (1–9) 5 (1–14)
  Median (IQR) NISS 2 (1–14) 10 (3–22) 2 (1–14) 9 (3–22) 2 (1–14) 10 (3–22)
  No (%) ISS 1–8 104 (68%) 37 (50%) 71 (65%) 23 (47%) 33 (75%) 14 (56%)
  No (%) ISS 9–15 30 (20%) 19 (26%) 26 (24 %) 15 (32%) <5 (<11%) <5 (<25 %)
  No (%) ISS >15 19 (12%) 18 (24%) 12 (11.0%) 11 (22.0%) 7 (16 %) 7 (28 %)
  No (%) NISS 1–8 98 (64%) 32 (43%) 68 (62%) 21 43%) 30 (68%) 11 (44%)
  No (%) NISS 9–15 18 (12%) 12 (16%) 14 (13 %) 8 (16 %) <5 (<11%) 4 (16 %)
  No (%) NISS >15 37 (24%) 30 (40%) 27 (25 %) 20 (41 %) 10 (23 %) 10 (40%)














  No (%)—head 6 (4%) 6 (8%) <5 (<5 %) <5 (<10%) <5 (<11%) <5 (<20 %)
  No (%)—face <5 (<3%) <5 (<7%) <5 (<5 %) <5 (<10%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
  No (%)—chest 12 (8%) 10 (13%) 7 (6%) 5 (10 %) 5 (11%) 5 (20 %)
  No (%)—abdomen <5 (<3%) <5 (<7%) <5 (<5 %) <5 (<10%) <5 (<11%) <5 (<20%)
  No (%)—spine <5 (<3%) <5 (<7%) <5 (<5 %) <5 (<10%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
  No (%)—pelvis <5 (<3%) 0 (0%) <5 (<5 %) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%)
  No (%) —limbs 32 (21%) 21 (28%) 26 (24 %) 15 (31 %) 6 (14 %) 6 (24 %)
  No (%)—burns 5 (3%) 5 (7%) <5 (<5 %) <5 (<10 %) <5 (<11 %) <5 (<20 %)






Median (IQR) minutes 192 (94–287) 187 (92–286) 230 (95–285)
Patients arriving in ED within 6 hours by ISS       
  No (%) ISS 1–8 78 (51%) 53 (49%) 25 (57%)
  No (%) ISS 9–15 28 (18%) 24 (22%) 4 (9%)
  No (%) ISS >15 18 (12%) 11 (10%) 7 (16%)
  Median (IQR) minutes before ED arrival ISS 1–8 108 (70–242) 105 (70–194) 128 (91–270)
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department of their choice (which was anticipated) including 14 
patients presenting outside of the GMMTSN (table 1).
By 3:00 hour the following day, all ambulance transfers from 
incident scene had arrived at hospital—although patients self- 
presented to hospitals both before and after this time, some 
with significant injuries (table 1). At 5.25 hour, NWAS declared 
the end of the major incident ‘reception phase’ while the more 
prolonged hospital ‘definitive care phase’ was unfolding. 
Following arrival in emergency departments, it proved impos-
sible to retrieve patient- level data recorded at scene and so these 
data were not recorded in the TARN registry or linked to subse-
quent hospital care records.
Information from hospitals
The healthcare system treated 153 injured patients (109 adults 
and 44 paediatric patients) who attended emergency depart-
ments, including three hospital fatalities. As seen in table 1, 
a notable feature of these data is the age and sex profiles of 
patients, which can be explained by the presence of the young, 
predominately female, concert audience attracted by performer 
and the location and timing of the explosion in the entrance 
foyer where parents were waiting at the end of the concert.10 
The majority of GMMTSN hospitals treated patients with inju-
ries, with MTCs more likely to receive patients with major inju-
ries and with a requirement for critical care when compared with 
trauma units and local emergency hospitals together (table 1). 
Indeed, 19 of a total of 24 critical care admissions were for 
patients attending MTCs. There were a small number (two chil-
dren and three adults) who required subsequent secondary inter-
hospital transfer in the first 24 hours, predominantly between 
MTCs for additional specialist definitive surgical care.
Figure 2 shows the number of patients each hour; (1) arriving 
in emergency departments; (2) undergoing surgical procedures 
in operating departments and (3) present in critical care units 
over the first 24 hours, displaying the movement of injured 
patients to hospital services as the incident relocates from scene 
to emergency departments, operating departments and critical 
care units. It also shows the lag phases for patient presentations 
to these services.
The number of patients in operating departments shows two 
peaks. The first was during the night when 21 patients received 
emergency life- saving damage control surgery direct from the 
emergency department (table 1). A second larger peak in oper-
ation departments use occurred the following day. The number 
of patients admitted to critical care units increased rapidly both 
during the night and the following afternoon, reflecting the 
pattern of surgical activity.
As noted above, there was an unusually large number of injured 
children involved in this incident and the regional paediatric 
MTC received 12% of its annual major trauma caseload in one 
night. Children and adults had similar proportions of injuries 
by injury severity grouping (table 1). The bomb blast, in combi-
nation with high- energy shrapnel penetration, predominantly 
resulted in limb and/or torso major life- threatening injuries in 
both children and adults (table 1), although a greater propor-
tion of the major injuries in children were of head and chest 
compared with adults. The proportions of children and adults 
conveyed by NWAS ambulance from incident scene to hospital 
emergency departments were similar (table 1). The majority of 
children and adult patients arrived at emergency departments 
within the first 6 hours following bomb detonation (figure 2, 
table 1). However, for both children and adults, patients with 
All patients Adults (>16 years) Children (<16 years)
  Median (IQR) minutes before ED arrival ISS >15 129 (101–196) 125 (95–184) 178 (133–246)
Time in ED       
  Median (IQR) minutes 151 (99–223) 151 (109–240) 158 (99–205)
First ED CT- scan       
  No (%) requiring ED CT- scan 41 (27%) 35 (32%) 6 (14%)
  Median (IQR) minutes to first ED CT- scan 49 (25–82) 49 (25–82) 51 (47–55)
First surgical operation       
  Median (IQR) minutes to first surgical operation 558 (285–875) 565 (285–893) 536 (374–786)
Blood transfusion from ED arrival in first 24 hours       
  No (%) requiring blood transfusion 13 (8%) 10 (9%) <5 (<11 %)
  Median (IQR) units used for those requiring blood transfusion 1 (1–2) 2 (2–4) 1 (1–1)
ED disposition       
  Died in ED (mortuary) <5 (<3%) <5 (<5 %) <5 (<11 %)
  Operating rooms 21 (14%) 18 (16%) <5 (<11 %)
  CC 8 (5%) 7 (6%) <5 (<11%)
  Inter- hospital transfer <5 (<3%) <5 (<5 %) <5(<11%)
  Hospital ward 51 (33%) 35 (32 %) 16 (36%)
  Home 60 (39%) 39 (36%) 21 (48 %)
  Incomplete records 7 (5%) 6 (5%) 1 (2%)
  Total 153 109 44
Table 1 summarises demographic, patient dispersal, management and disposition information about major incident patients presenting to their original ED. Duplications resulting 
from any subsequent secondary inter- hospital transfer have been corrected for in these data. Primary receiving hospitals included MTC, a P- MTC, TU and LEH across GM and 
elsewhere in the UK. A Major Trauma Centre is the UK equivalent of a level-1 Trauma Centre in North America; a Trauma Unit is the equivalent of level-2 and a Local Emergency 
Hospital is level-3. Patient numbers requiring CC at each centre are indicated. Injury severity is summarised using the ISS and the NISS. Major injury by body region is summarised 
using the AIS. Population data include counts, percentages, medians and IQR as appropriate. Medians and IQR for systolic blood pressure, respiratory rate and Glasgow Coma 
Score on arrival in the ED are not presented due to the large amount of missing data (see figure 1).
AIS, Abbreviated Injury Severity Score; GM, Greater Manchester; ISS, Injury Severity Score; LEH, local emergency hospitals; MTC, major trauma centres; NISS, new ISS; P- MTC, 
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either the most severe injuries (ISS >15) or the least severe 
injuries (ISS 1–8) were likely to arrive at a hospital emergency 
department in advance of those with intermediate severe injuries 
(ISS 8–15) (table 1). In the first 6 hours, children and adults 
arriving by ambulance from incident scene had the most severe 
injuries (median ISS 14 (IQR 4–20) and 10 (6–14), respectively). 
In addition, children and adults arriving at emergency depart-
ments independent from planned emergency responses had the 
least severe injuries (median ISS 1(IQR 1–1) and 1 (IQR 1–1), 
respectively).
In emergency departments, computer tomography scans were 
performed for similar proportions of children and adults, and the 
times to first scan were similar for both groups (table 1). Similar 
proportions of children and adults required blood transfusion 
in the first 24 hours from bomb blast, with smaller volume used 
in children (table 1). Compared with adults, children were less 
likely to require emergency surgery and critical care direct from 
the emergency department and, overall, children were more 
likely to be discharged into the community following emergency 
department assessment and care (table 1).
Surgical operations for both children and adults (table 2) were 
most commonly performed on skin, soft- tissue and limbs–which 
was similar for emergency surgery over the night of the inci-
dent (‘first wave’), emergent surgery the following day (‘second 
wave’) and repeated surgical interventions beyond the first 24 
hours. Up to 30 days, the median number of surgical operations 
for both adults and children was 2 (IQR 1–3), and 3 (IQR 1–4) 
for patients managed at MTCs. Data presented in online supple-
mental figure S3 shows evidence for a long ‘surgical tail’ where 
patients required repeated surgery; most commonly for complex 
shrapnel, bone and soft tissue injuries of lower limbs.
Overall, surgical operations were most likely performed by 
senior trained surgeons (table 3) and, for the patients with the 
most severe injuries, were more likely provided by specialists at 
an MTC (table 1). For patients arriving at hospital, three patients 
died in an emergency department (table 1) and all those requiring 
hospital admission were alive at day 30 with their disposition 
summarised in online supplemental table S1.
Information from Greater Manchester acute healthcare 
system
Healthcare activity data on 22 May 2017, suggested an under 
pressure NHS acute hospital system across Greater Manchester 
prior to the incident (figure 3 and online supplemental figures 
S4–S9). Planned surgery was reduced markedly following the 
incident, recovering to usual patterns in the next week (figure 3). 
Figure 2 Incident patients per hour arriving at emergency 
departments (A), present in operating rooms (B) and critical care units 
(C) in first 24 hours. Patient numbers are shown per hour with the time 
axis indicting the start of each hour period.
Table 2 Surgical operations
No (%) and timing of surgical operations by 
body region for all patients
No (%) and timing of surgical operations by 
body region for adults
No (%) and timing of surgical operations by 























Abdomen 6 (15) <5 (<6) 6 (3) <5 (<31) 5 (16) 0 (0) <5 (2) <5 (<36) <5 (<62) <5 (<24) <5 (<88) 0 (0)
Face 0 (0) <5 (<6) 7 (4) 0 (0) 0 (0) <5 (<8) <5 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0) <5 (<24) <5 (<88) 0 (0)
General <5 (<12) 5 (6) 5 (3) <5 (<31) <5 (<16) <5 (<8) <5 (2) <5 (<36) 0 (0) <5 (5) <5 (<88) 0 (0)
Head and brain <5 (<12) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) <5 (<62) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Limbs 9 (22) 13 (15) 44 (23) <5 (<31) 8 (25) 11 (17) 30 (23) <5 (<36) <5 (12) <5 (<24) 14 (25) 0 (0)
Skin/soft- tissue 19 (47) 58 (69) 127 (67) 11 (69) 14 (44) 43 (68) 93 (70) 9 (64) 5 (62) 15 (71) 34 (60) <5 (100)
Spine 0 (0) <5 (<6) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) <5 (<8) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Thoracic <5 (<12) <5 (<6) 0 (0) <5 (<31) <5 (<16) <5 (<8) 0 (0) <5 (<36) 0 (0) <5 (<24) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Total 40 84 189 16 32 63 132 14 8 21 57 <5
Table 2 shows the number (%) of surgical operations performed by recorded body region for all patients and for adults and children alone. Timing of operations are split into 
‘first wave’ (emergency surgery performed up to 9:00 hour on 23 May 2017), ‘second wave’ (emergent surgery performed after 9:00 hour on 23 May 2017) and ‘later operations’ 
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In addition, there was an immediate surge in hospital patient 
discharges into the community (online supplemental figure S6). 
There was also evidence of decreased emergency department 
visits for a number of weeks (online supplemental figure S4). 
There were sustained system- wide hospital service improve-
ments with emergency departments increasing the proportion of 
patients treated within 4 hours (online supplemental figure S9), 
reductions in delays to transfer care into the community (online 
supplemental figure S7) and improvements in hospital bed utili-
sation (online supplemental figure S8).
DISCUSSION
We have shown that during the responses to a civilian major 
trauma terrorist incident, detailed patient- level information and 
routine hospital performance data can be collated and used to 
examine the demands placed on a city’s healthcare system. To 
our knowledge, no similar data of this granularity have been 
presented previously either from terrorist incidents5 6 or human-
itarian disasters.18
A number of important lessons have been identified. The 
pattern of arrival of injured patients at emergency departments 
is important, reflecting the constraints at incident scene and 
providing an opportunity to implement hospital major incident 
plans to enhance emergency capacity. In a recent independent 
review,15 the factors that may have contributed to phasing of 
patients clearing the scene have been considered and systems 
learning recommended. The review also alluded to the impor-
tance of successful implementation of the Patient Dispersal 
Framework. At incident scene patients were evacuated, based on 
clinical priority, to a variety of hospitals with agreed predefined 
care capacity and clinical expertise best suited to a patient’s 
needs. We believe that data presented here are consistent with 
successful implementation of this plan to enable an already 
under pressure regional hospital healthcare system to main-
tain resilience at a time of increased demand and provide the 
best available care to the patients it serves. For example, more 
severely injured adults and children were likely to be conveyed 
to hospital emergency departments by ambulance and these 
receiving hospitals were likely to be MTCs suggesting that inci-
dent scene triage was performed effectively. For this incident, 
effective implementation of the Patient Dispersal Framework at 
incident scene appeared particularly important to assure timely 
access to very specialised services such as paediatric trauma 
care—an important point previously identified by Carli et al 
following responses to terrorist events in France.19
We have documented the patterns of patient movement and 
subsequent care, spreading from incident scene into hospitals, 
and the consequent impact on ‘normal’ healthcare provision for 
both emergency and elective care. Our ability to provide emer-
gency hospital care for both children and adults was never over-
whelmed but was at the expense of a significant loss of planned 
surgical capacity and a reliance on local community services 
to help free up hospital capacity. Based on evidence presented 
here, we would recommend enhancing mutual aid planning with 
adjoining regions to improve both emergency and elective care 
capacity in the event of future potentially more complex inci-
dents such as that encountered in Paris in 2015.11 12 Ideally, this 
would be an integrated national plan.
There are limitations to this report. Our major incident 
plans did not include provision for real- time capture of patient 
data. However, detailed patient information was captured 
from hospital records following a rapid decision to deploy 
the TARN registry. These data were near- complete except for 
high levels of missing recorded values for emergency depart-
ment vital signs which resulted in a lack of reliable evidence 
Table 3 Seniority of surgeon
No (%) and timing of surgical operations by 
surgeon seniority for all patients
No (%) and timing of surgical operations by 
surgeon seniority for adults
No (%) and timing of surgical operations 
























Consultant 36 (90) 75 (90) 158 (84) 15 (94) 31 (97) 56 (89) 104 (79) 14 (100) 5 (62) 19 (90) 54 (95) 1 (50)
Not consultant 3 (8) 7 (8) 21 (11) 0 (0) 0 (0) 6 (9) 18 (14) 0 (0) 2 (25) 1 (5) 3 (5) 0 (0)
Not recorded 1 (2) 2 (2) 10 (5) 1 (6) 1 (3) 1 (2) 10 (8) 0 1 (12) 1 (5) 0 (0) 1 (50)
Total 40 84 189 16 32 63 132 14 8 21 57 2
Table 3 shows the number (%) of surgical operations performed by surgeon seniority for all patients and for adults and children alone. Timing of operations are split into ‘first 
wave’ (emergency surgery performed up to 9:00 hour on 23 May 2017), ‘second wave’ (emergent surgery performed after 9:00 hour on 23 May 2017) and ‘later operations’ 
(surgery performed after the first day up to 30 days following the incident).
Figure 3 Shewhart (process behaviour) charts for both total daily 
elective surgical cancellations for patients already hospitalised and 
total daily hospital admission for elective surgery across Greater 
Manchester. Charts show patient (adult and children) data over six 
consecutive weeks for NHS hospitals across Greater Manchester (GM). 
Data for both the daily total elective surgical cancellations for patients 
already in hospital (CanEL) and the daily total hosptial admissions 
for elective surgery (EOA) are displayed. Mean data (red lines) are 
modelled for 3 months around the incident data (April–June 2017), 
with lower confidence limits (lcl) and upper confidence limits (ucl) 
indicating the 99.7% expected data limits. Actual recorded daily data 
are superimposed on these charts and the incident date (Monday 22nd 
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to allow a robust review of patient priority (triage) categories. 
High- quality data arising in the first few days, particularly on 
patterns of physical injury, did allow NHS England to antici-
pate impacts on regional healthcare provision; national supply 
chains; and the need to deploy national resources including 
public health services.20 NHS England were able to do this at 
an earlier stage than had been anticipated and these lessons 
on early patient data capture/collation have been incorporated 
into future national plans.
At an individual patient level, it was not possible for the TARN 
national registry to capture care data records from scene and to 
link these with records of subsequent hospital care, which we 
believe is a challenge internationally. A folding cruciform triage 
card information system deployed at scene for each patient did 
not prove robust enough to convey information into hospital 
care. In our view, major incident planning could be improved 
by developing individual patient identifiers, and an agreed core 
dataset, incorporating linked records from scene to hospital. Inci-
dent reporting templates have been proposed by other authors, 
but they lack the detail required to track patients through the 
system, typically either focusing on injury patterns2 21 or EMS 
systems.5 22 Innovations to facilitate patient information collec-
tion and data presentation should be considered as part of 
planned system- wide responses. The development and provision 
of computerised tools to collect and visualise streaming data 
could be a further beneficial development.
The benefits of collecting standardised healthcare data have 
been recognised internationally. For example, there is an inter-
nationally established system for reporting data about cardiac 
arrest resuscitation in the community.23 While such emergencies 
are relatively rare in any one locality, they occur internationally 
with sufficient frequency that standardised data collection has 
generated a significant body of information.23 This has informed 
the preparation of protocols for the most effective emergency 
treatment. Suggestions for international data collection for 
hospital responses to major trauma events have been proposed 
since the 1990s1 2 6 24 25 but have not been widely adopted. 
Recent civilian terrorist events are creating an urgent public 
health need to re- energise this work to develop data driven 
evidence to underpin system improvements.9 In England, as a 
direct response to our recommendations, the TARN registry has 
developed a major incident module for deployment at future 
major trauma incidents. The extension of this approach so that 
anonymised data are collected internationally, to an agreed stan-
dard, would significantly increase the volume of data available to 
researchers and emergency planners.
Finally, we were unable to identify robust data sources to 
report on patients with minor injuries who may have presented 
to, and received their care, at community family medicine facil-
ities rather than emergency hospital departments. In addition, 
we do not know the true impact on community- based health-
care services of cancelled elective surgical operations, increased 
hospital discharges into community care and the sustained 
reductions in emergency department attendances in the weeks 
following the incident. However, the richness of the hospital 
data that we have gathered will permit separate deeper analysis 
such as modelling patient surge capacity as well as understanding 
impacts on imaging departments, blood transfusion and other 
hospital services. Additional work is progressing on data about 
longer term patient reported outcomes; responses to physical 
rehabilitation; and learning from population psychological 
screening, interventions and recovery.
CONCLUSIONS
The systematic collation of injured patient and healthcare system 
data has provided an objective evaluation of a regional major inci-
dent plan and provided insight into healthcare system resilience.
Major civilian trauma events are rare in any one country but 
are not an uncommon global event. The preplanned collection, 
archiving and use of patient and healthcare data in an agreed, 
standardised way would facilitate improvements in the evidence 
base and learning from future incidents internationally.
Twitter Paul Dark @DarkNatter and Simon Carley @EMManchester
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Methods S1: Injury severity scores 
Major trauma patients may have one or many injuries and the Injury Severity Score (ISS) is an anatomical score 
that measures the overall severity of injured patients
1
 and is used to predict survival after injury
2
. For an 
individual patient, all of their injuries are assigned an Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS)
3
 code and score from an 
internationally recognised dictionary that describes over 2000 injuries ranging from 1 (minor injury) to 6 (an 
injury that is thought to be ‘incompatible with life’). Patients with multiple injuries are scored by adding 
together the squares of the three highest AIS scores in three predetermined regions of the body. This is the ISS, 
which can range from 1 to 75. By convention, a patient with an AIS code of 6 in one body region is given an 
ISS of 75. 
 
The ISS has some limitations in the assessment of multiple injuries located in the same body compartment. For 
example, in a patient with multiple bone fractures, the ISS will only include the most severe bone injury and 
may underestimate the overall severity by ignoring other significant skeletal injuries. Therefore, a New Injury 
Severity Score (NISS) has been developed
4
 to include the three most severe AIS values, irrespective of body 
region, with the aim of taking better account of multiple injuries in the same body region. However, there is no 
high-quality evidence that NISS is a better predictor of outcome than ISS in major trauma
5,6
. In this manuscript, 
therefore, ISS and NISS are reported together.        
 
National major trauma audit is undertaken by the Trauma Audit and Research Network (TARN) on behalf of 
NHS England. The assignment of AIS codes and scores for the TARN registry are undertaken by trained coders 
within a quality assurance programme. AIS, ISS and NISS are all reported, with major injury in any one body 
compartment defined as AIS ≥3. 
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Figure S1 represents the geographical distribution of the Greater Manchester Major Trauma System Network 
(GMMTSN) operational during the Manchester Arena bombing incident. Central Manchester NHS Foundation 
Trust (CMFT), Salford Royal NHS Foundation Trust (SRFT) and the University Hospital of South Manchester 
NHS Foundation Trust (UHSM), blue circles, were  designated as major trauma centers (MTC) and function 
collaboratively as a Level-1 Trauma Centre. The Royal Manchester Children’s Hospital, red circle, is the 
Paediatric Major Trauma Centre (P-MTC). The Royal Albert and Edward Infirmary Wigan (RAEI), the Royal 
Oldham Hospital and Stepping Hill Hospital Stockport, orange circles, are designated Trauma Units (TU) and 
each is equivalent to a Level-2 Trauma Centre. Local Emergency Hospitals (LEH) include Bolton, Fairfield 
Bury, North Manchester and Tameside – green circles – and function as Level-3 Trauma Centres. The location 
of the Manchester Arena bombing incident is indicated in yellow.  
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Figure S2 summarises Greater Manchester Major Trauma System Network’s Major Incident Plan Patient 
Dispersal Framework operational in May 2017.  The plan resulted from a detailed review of healthcare 
capabilities across Greater Manchester (GM). The plan was agreed at each hospital in advance of an incident 
and had been rehearsed at a regional level in March 2017
7
. Three hospitals were designated as Major Trauma 
Centres (MTC) for seriously injured adult patients assessed at the scene by the Emergency Medical Service 
(EMS) with a P1 priority sort code (patients who require immediate life-saving treatment), and a single MTC for 
paediatric patients. Designated trauma units (Level-2 Trauma Centres) receive patients with a P2 priority sort 
code (patients who require treatment within 6 hours) and other Local Emergency Hospitals (Level-3 Trauma 
Centres) receive the least seriously injured P3 priority code patients (less serious cases who require treatment 
but not within a set time). At scene, the EMS selects destinations for P1 patients to ensure that (i) patient flows 
at each MTC does not exceed its pre-determined capacity of 10 patients per hour and (ii) to transfer patients to 
MTCs with specializations that patients are likely to need such as neuro-injury at one of the MTC hospitals. The 
EMS divert patients from unrelated emergencies from the MTCs to the other hospitals to release capacity and 
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Figure S4 is the Shewhart chart showing patient (adult and children) data for total daily ambulance arrivals at 
EDs over six consecutive weeks for NHS hospitals across Greater Manchester (GM). Note that Monday 29
th
 
May 2017 was a national holiday in England. ED attendances were higher than the predicated mean on the day 
of the incident. Thereafter, an immediate reduction in ED attendances is apprent for Greater Manchester 
hospitals, with evidence of sustained reductions (> 7 days). 
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Figure S5: Emergency admissions at Greater Manchester Major Trauma System Network hospitals 
 
 
Figure S5 is the Shewhart chart showing patient (adult and children) data for total daily emergency hospital 
admissions over six consecutive weeks for NHS hospitals across Greater Manchester (GM). Note that Monday 
29
th
 May 2017 was a national holiday in England. Emergency hospital admissions were higher than their 
predicated mean on the day of the incident. Thereafter, an immediate further increase in emergency hopsital 
admissions is apprent for Greater Manchester hospitals (approaching the 99.7% upper confidence limit), which 
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Figure S6 is the Shewhart chart showing patient (adult and children) data for total daily unplanned discharges 
from hospital to community care over six consecutive weeks for NHS hospitals across Greater Manchester 
(GM). Note that Monday 29
th
 May 2017 was a national holiday in England. Immediately following the 
incindent, there was a marked surge in unplanned patient discharges from Greater Manchester hospitals, which 
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Figure S7: Delays for transfer of patient care* from hospital to the community for Greater Manchester 
Major Trauma System Network compared with a control region 
 
 
Figure S7 is the Shewhart chart showing patient (adult and children) data for total daily delayed discharges from 
hospital to community care over six consecutive weeks for NHS hospitals across Greater Manchester (GM). 
Note that Monday 29
th
 May 2017 was a national holiday in England. Immediately following the incindent, there 
was a sustained reduction (> 7 days) in delayed hopsital discharges from Greater Manchester hospitals.  
*NHS England defines patients as ready for care transfer when: a. A clinical decsion has been made that the 
patient is ready for transfer AND b. A multi-disciplinary team decsion has been made that the patient is ready 
for transfer AND c. The patient is safe to discharge/transfer. Patients who have been assessed as ready for care 
transfer and remain in hospital at midnight each day are recored as delays to transfer of care in this figure. 
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Figure S8: Medical outliers** for Greater Manchester Major Trauma System Network 
 
 
Figure S8 is the Shewhart chart showing patient (adult and children) data on hospital bed utilization (‘medical 
outliers’) over six consecutive weeks for NHS hospitals across Greater Manchester (GM). Note that Monday 
29
th
 May 2017 was a national holiday in England. Immediately following the incident, there were sustained 
reductions in ‘medical outliers’ in Greater Manchester hospitals (> 7-days), approaching the 99.7% lower 
confidence limit at a nadir 5-days after the incident.  
** Medical outliers are internal medicine patients counted at midnight who occupied hospital beds designated 
for non-internal medicine patients (e.g. surgical specialties).    
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Figure S9: Proportion of emergency department (ED) patients with care completion within 4-hours of 
attendance at Greater Manchester Major Trauma System Network EDs compared with a control region 
 
 
Figure S9 is the Shewhart chart showing patient (adult and children) data on care completion within 4 hours of 
ED attendance over six consecutive weeks for NHS hospitals across Greater Manchester (GM). Note that 
Monday 29
th
 May 2017 was a national holiday in England. Immediately following the incident, there was a 
marked increase in the proportion of ED patients being treated within 4 hours in Greater Manchetser hospitals, 
approaching the 99.7% upper confidence limits. This improvement was sustained (> 7-days) for emeregncy 
departments across Greater Manchester.   
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Table S1: Patient disposition at 30-days following hospital admission 
 
Patient disposition at 30-days from hospital admission All Adults Children 
Home (own) 113 77 36 
Acute hospital 36 29 7 
Mortuary 3 2 1 
No fixed abode 1 1 0 
Rehabilitation facility 0 0 0 
Total 153 109 44 
 
 
Table S1 shows patient disposition recorded at 30-days following emergency hospital admission or death, 
whichever occurred first. 
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